We analyze the evaluations of California energy-efficiency programs to assess the effectiveness of these evaluations in: 1) improving our understanding of their performance and 2) providing a check on utility incentives to overstate energy savings. We find that third-party evaluations are useful tools to achieve both ends because the programs largely did not meet their energy-savings projections, and the utility-reported savings estimates are systematically higher than the evaluated savings estimates. We also find evidence that the choice of the third-party evaluator was influential in determining the estimate of evaluated savings.
Introduction
Energy efficiency is a key component of local and national strategies to reduce energy use and combat global warming. The National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (2008)-a consortium of electric and gas utilities, utility regulators, and other U.S. stakeholders-identifies the goal of achieving all cost-effective energy-efficiency measures in the country by 2025, representing more than $500 billion in net savings. Realizing these substantial efficiencies in such a short time period will require a massive effort to successfully identify opportunities and implement energy-efficiency programs. Many states and countries already have begun this effort. This paper will focus on ex-post measurements of the savings that can be attributed to energy-efficiency programs. The third-party program evaluations that supply these measurements are a controversial component of the effort to improve energy efficiency in this country. The objective of this paper is to provide an assessment of the information from these energy-efficiency program evaluations using empirical data from California.
The importance of energy-efficiency program evaluations is derived largely from the unfortunate reality that energy savings are extremely difficult to measure. It is common for projections and estimates of energy savings to be calculated by program implementers using simple formulas, such as the number of units of an efficiency measure installed multiplied by the presumed energy savings per unit. Because these formulas fail to take into account consumer behavior and other factors, they are highly imprecise. Better measurement of energy savings requires the monitoring of actual energy usage and an answer to the counterfactual question: how much energy would have been used in the absence of an energy-efficiency program? Ex-post program evaluations go beyond the simple formulas described above, using measurements of actual consumer behavior to calculate energy savings. The more sophisticated measurements * Kaufman (noah.kaufman@mail.utexas.edu) is a former RFF summer intern and a graduate student in the economics department at the University of Texas at Austin. Palmer (palmer@rff.org) is the Darius Gaskins Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future. We are grateful to Joe Loper, Michael Rufo, Shanjun Li, Juha Siikamaki and seminar participants at the University of Texas at Austin for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
provided by the evaluations are useful for two primary reasons. First, evaluations provide an opportunity to learn more about the relative performance of the different types of energyefficiency measures and programs as well as the policies that facilitate the implementation and effectiveness of these efforts. While energy-efficiency programs and efforts to estimate the savings they produce have existed for several decades, our understanding of the most costeffective methods to achieve energy savings is still in its infancy. A great deal of trial and error and policy experimentation must take place to improve this understanding, so it is important to learn when these experiments have failed and succeeded. Designers and implementers of energyefficiency programs will rely on these conclusions in revising and expanding programs. Moreover, the savings measurements in ex-post evaluations are themselves an inexact science.
The more evaluations that are conducted, the better we can determine how precise and useful these measurements are compared to ex ante projections.
A second motivation for conducting energy-efficiency program evaluations stems from the independence of the third-party evaluators. This independence enables their evaluations to function as a component of a regulatory structure known as a "performance incentive mechanism," which we now explain briefly.
The performance of energy-efficiency programs depends on the actions of the local electric and gas utilities that oversee the programs. A challenge for utility regulators is how to provide incentives for utilities to promote efforts to save energy. Under cost-of-service regulation, electric and gas utilities do not have an incentive to maximize their customers' energy savings. In fact, utilities' profit margins typically decrease as customer energy use decreases, so a fundamental conflict of interest lies between the utilities' desire to sell energy and the public interest in conserving energy. Removing this conflict of interest is the motivation behind methods of decoupling utilities' revenues from their sales. Under a decoupling mechanism, rates are adjusted so that utilities do not lose money as electricity sales decline and cannot earn extra revenue if actual sales are above projected sales.
While decoupling mechanisms remove the incentive for utilities to resist energyconservation efforts, some states have now gone a step further in providing rewards for utilities that successfully promote these efforts. A performance-incentive mechanism is a regulatory framework that provides utilities with the opportunity to earn a profit from energy-efficiency activities in their service territories, often by allocating to them a small percentage of the value of the energy savings. In the case of California, the performance-incentive mechanism that is currently in place includes threshold values for savings above which the incentive payment to the utility increases dramatically.
Performance-incentive mechanisms also provide an incentive for utilities to claim as much energy savings as possible, in order to earn greater profits. These greater profits are directly at the expense of the ratepayers in the utilities' service territories. The difficulty of verifying or refuting energy-savings claims puts electricity consumers and regulators at a disadvantage in assessing savings reported by utilities. For this reason, independent ex-post measurements can be a valuable check on the utilities' incentive to overestimate energy savings.
In this paper, we analyze the results of the recently completed evaluations of the 2004-2005 California utility energy-efficiency programs compared to both ex-ante savings projections and the results reported by the electric and gas utilities. It is extremely rare to find in the public domain a dataset with comparable projected, reported, and evaluated savings data. This unique dataset enables us to analyze both objectives of energy-efficiency program evaluations described above: First, related to the use of evaluations as an opportunity for learning, we compare the exante savings projections with the ex-post evaluated savings measurements. Second, related to the use of evaluations as a check on the incentives of the electric and gas utilities, we compare the utility-reported savings estimates with the ex-post evaluated savings measurements. Using techniques of statistics and econometrics, we identify what differentiates energy-efficiency programs that have had higher evaluated savings compared to predicted savings than others, and what differentiates programs that have had independent evaluations confirm or exceed the utilityreported energy savings.
We aim to give policymakers and regulators a better idea of the benefits of incorporating independent evaluations into their performance-incentive mechanisms, and to provide valuable information to those who will be designing and implementing energy-efficiency programs in the near future.
We find that the energy-efficiency programs in the 2004-2005 California program cycle did not meet ex-ante expectations in terms of electricity savings, gas savings, or peak-demand savings. We also find that the utility-reported electricity savings estimates are systematically higher than the third-party evaluated savings estimates, indicating that the incentive to overstate savings may affect the utilities' reports. Interestingly, the particular contractor chosen to conduct the evaluation (or an unobservable correlated with this choice) appears to be an important determinant of the level of the evaluated savings estimates when compared to both the ex-ante projections and the utility-reported results. Specifically, the largest and most commonly used evaluators are associated with the programs with relatively lower evaluated savings estimates, suggesting that these particular evaluators may provide a greater scrutiny of savings than that provided by other evaluators.
The California Performance Incentive Mechanism
Since the 1970s, California has been at the forefront of U.S. pursuits of energy-efficiency goals. Supply shortages, air pollution, and increasing concerns regarding the emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere have heightened the emphasis on energy efficiency in California in recent years. As a result, the state has focused a great deal of resources on efforts to conserve energy.
California's energy-efficiency programs are administered largely by the states' four investor-owned utilities (IOUs) with the oversight of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The state's performance-incentive mechanism, known as the Risk-Reward Incentive Mechanism (RRIM), awards profits to an IOU based on the savings produced by the energyefficiency programs in its service area compared to predetermined annual savings goals. The energy savings are monetized and divided among the IOU shareholders, in the form of profits to the utility, and the California ratepayers in the form of lower energy bills over time. Specifically, if the utility achieved more than 85 percent of its savings goals, the incentive payment increased from 0 percent to 9 percent of the value of energy savings. If the savings exceeded 100 percent of savings goals, the incentive payment increased from 9 percent to 12 percent (CPUC 2007) .
Though the RRIM was not formally adopted until 2006, the measures of energy savings were to be cumulative, starting in 2004, to ensure that the IOUs would focus on long-term goals. Therefore, the RRIM would encompass the performance of the 2004-2005 programs. 1 Evaluation, measurement, and verification (EM&V) of energy savings has been a major component of California's energy-efficiency efforts. The CPUC has stated, "[R]atepayers will only be required to share net benefits with (IOU) shareholders to the extent that those net benefits actually materialize, based on EM&V results" (CPUC 2007, pages 12-13) . For the 2004- The IOUs have complained about the delays of the EM&V process and the fairness of the evaluations' use of ex-post savings measurements to determine the performance of the energyefficiency programs. They have argued that ex-post evaluations should be used only to update the energy-savings goals for each program cycle and improve future program designs. Profits, the IOUs claim, should be regular and predictable, and contingent only on periodic verifications of program costs and installations. In contrast, ratepayer advocates have argued that IOUs should only earn profits if and when it is shown by an independent evaluator that energy savings attributable to an energy-efficiency program have occurred. Otherwise, ratepayers will likely pay for savings that have not actually been achieved.
The CPUC has stood in the middle of this controversy, attempting to balance two counteracting goals. On one hand, it is important to provide sufficient and attainable rewards to the IOUs so that they will be motivated to produce actual energy savings. On the other hand, the CPUC has the responsibility to minimize the costs to the California ratepayers and taxpayers of providing these rewards. These costs include both the IOUs' profits (which otherwise would have been returned to ratepayers in the form of lower rates) and the administrative costs of the programs and related bureaucracy. The ex-post evaluations unquestionably have decreased the predictability of a portion of IOU earnings and added delays and costs to the process. The The IOUs chose the contractors that conducted the evaluations. However, the CPUC provided the IOUs with a list of contractors from which they could make their selections, and the commission also had the right to approve or deny each selection based on the independence and qualifications of the contractor for the specific evaluation efforts it would undertake. According to the CPUC, the key criteria for the choice of the evaluation teams were the professional experience and expertise of the contractors. Smaller programs required just one contractor to complete an evaluation, while larger and more complex programs required the collaboration of a number of contractors.
While more than 200 programs were funded through the public-goods charge (TecMarket Works Framework Team 2007) , some were for informational or educational purposes and did not have energy-savings goals or require impact evaluations. In contrast, the evaluated programs included in these data are mainly "resource acquisition" programs, which provide incentives to customers to upgrade to more energy-efficient equipment. The full list of evaluated programs can be found in the Appendix. These programs include a variety of different measures, such as efforts to install high-efficiency faucets in food service establishments, no-cost energy audits for residential homes, and the distribution of free energy-efficient compact fluorescent bulbs and fluorescent torchiere lamps. Forty-four percent of the programs were offered to more than one customer class.
In its
While the requirements for the evaluations were the same across programs, the contractors that performed these evaluations were very different in size, experience, and expertise. with a staff of two in a single office in California. Not surprisingly given the relative size of the companies, the large firms tended to evaluate the larger programs. The average budget of a program evaluated by either Large Firm A or Large Firm B was $9.1 million, whereas the average budget of the remaining programs was $3.6 million. More than one evaluator assessed thirty-seven percent of the programs (but we made no attempt to discern which evaluators performed which functions for these programs).
Program budgets and expenditures, as reported by the IOUs, are displayed in Figure 4 .
Programs had spent an average of 75 percent of their total budgets by the time the final IOU reports on the programs were issued. 
Number of Programs by Evaluator
The IPMVP provides evaluators with four options on how to measure energy impacts.
Option A, "Partially Measured Retrofit Isolation," requires that savings be determined by shortterm or continuous field measurements of energy use. For Option A, some parameters can be taken from second-hand sources ("stipulated parameters"), as long as the potential error from doing so is not significant. Option B, "Retrofit Isolation," is the same as Option A, except no parameters may be stipulated. Option C is called "Whole Facility," and savings are determined by directly measuring energy use at the whole facility level rather than using a particular energy source on which a program focuses. Option C is useful for programs that affect many different systems within a building. Finally, Option D, "Calibrated Simulation," requires that savings be determined via simulation of the energy use of components or the whole facility (IPMVP 2002) . Figure 5 displays the number of energy-efficiency programs that claimed to use each option described above. Some larger programs claimed to use more than one option. Twenty-two evaluations did not state which option was chosen, and a few evaluations stated that they did not use any options of the IPMVP, generally due to budgetary concerns. It should be noted that we did not attempt to determine how rigorously the evaluations followed the guidelines for each option set forth in the IPMVP. Moreover, these options comprised just one component of the evaluations and were not necessarily reflective of the rigor of the full evaluations.
The IOU filings break out the total program budgets and expenditures by category, one of which is EM&V spending. Figure 6 displays the mean and median percentages of the total exante budget and total ex-post expenditures allocated to EM&V spending, as reported by the IOUs. 
Comparison of the Differences in Energy-Savings Estimates
The objective of this section is to compare the three compiled estimates of energy savings We provide a summary of the savings estimates in Table 1 . It reports measures of savings 4 with three different metrics: megawatt hours (MWh), megawatts (MW), and therms. The MWh and therm measurements are the aggregate amounts of electricity and gas, respectively, used over a period of time. The MW measurement is the demand for electricity at 4 The IOU filings report a single value for cumulative annual net energy savings, which is calculated by the formula: (total units installed)*(energy savings per unit)*(NTG ratio peak usage hours, which is of crucial importance because electricity is not storable, so avoiding power outages requires sufficient generating capacity to serve the demand of customers at peak times. Since peak electricity demand is inherently more difficult to measure than aggregate energy use, it is likely that the estimates of savings in MW are relatively less precise.
We define a "realization rate" as ex-post estimated savings (from either the IOU reports or the third-party evaluations) divided by ex-ante projected savings. The "IOU accuracy ratio" is defined as evaluated savings divided by IOU-reported savings. The confidence intervals on the median value (right-most column) are obtained using the binomial method.
From Table 1 , we draw two primary conclusions relating to the two potential benefits of evaluations described above. First, the evaluated realization rates show that evaluated savings were substantially lower than projected savings-none of the median confidence intervals for the evaluated realization rates include 100 percent. These evaluations provide valuable revisions of the ex-ante projections of savings and therefore may offer very different conclusions as to the performance of specific types of program.
Second, large differences exist between the IOU-reported and evaluated savings estimates. In particular, evaluated savings are systematically lower than IOU-reported savings. Finally, we offer three other notes regarding the data in Table 1 . The "median" and "mean" values substantially differ, showing that outliers influence these data. We discuss this issue in more detail below. Also, total realizations rates are generally lower than both mean and median realization rates. This reflects lower realization rates for the largest programs (because small and large programs are implicitly given equal weighting in the calculation of the median and mean realization rates). Lastly, the IOU accuracy ratio is much higher for MW savings than it is for either measure of energy savings. This higher level of accuracy in reported estimates of peak period savings is likely due to the limited time duration of peak demand periods and thus the limited potential for behavioral factors to cause savings to deviate from more engineering based estimates.
Non-Parametric Tests
The benefits of the energy-efficiency program evaluations both as an opportunity for learning about how to improve program performance and as a component of a performanceincentive mechanism is contingent on whether the evaluated savings estimates significantly differ from other estimates of savings. In this section, we perform statistical tests to analyze these differences.
Because of the relatively small number of observations for each savings metric, we provide non-parametric tests of the hypotheses that the IOU-reported savings estimates are equal to the evaluated savings estimates, and that the ex-ante projected savings estimates are equal to the evaluated savings estimates. The advantage of using these tests, as compared to a standard ttest, is that they require minimal assumptions regarding the underlying distribution of data.
The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks test is used to determine whether differences exist between groups of paired data points. The null hypothesis is that the differences between the matched pairs of data have a median value of zero. In other words, if S ie is the evaluated savings estimate for program i, and S ir is the IOU-reported savings estimate for program i, the differences in savings estimates are calculated as S ie -S ir for each i. The null hypothesis is that across all programs, the median value of (S ie -S ir ) = 0. If we can reject the null hypothesis, then we can conclude that the differences between the savings estimates are not simply due to chance or sampling error. The assumption underlying this test is that the distribution of differences between each matched pair is symmetric. In addition, we performed Sign Tests (Snedecor and Cochran 1967) , which are similar to the Wilcoxon tests in that they assess the equality of matched pairs of observations. The null hypothesis of a Sign Test is that the probability that one member of the matched pair is greater than the other member of the pair is exactly 50 percent, and the median of the differences between the matched pairs is zero. Using the notation explained above, pr(S ie >S ir ) = 50 percent and Median(S ie -S ir )=0. Unlike the Wilcoxon test, the distribution of the differences of matched pairs no longer has to be symmetric for the results of the test to be valid. Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence of significant differences between the various estimates of energy savings. We can strongly reject the hypothesis that the projected savings estimates and evaluated savings estimates are equal for any of the three savings metrics. This is to be expected.
As mentioned above, ex-post measurements of actual consumer behavior should be more accurate in calculating energy savings than ex-ante predictions. The evaluations therefore provide program implementers and regulators with a different and presumably more accurate picture of the performance of the programs-and what differentiates programs that are more successful at producing savings from ones that are less successful.
The results of the Wilcoxon test are not quite as conclusive for the comparison between IOU-reported and evaluated savings data. Only the equality of the matched pairs of gas-savings estimates can be strongly rejected, while the equality of the matched pairs of electricity-savings estimates can be weakly rejected. The equality of the matched pairs of the peak demand estimates cannot be rejected (which could be because the estimates are actually from the same distribution, or, perhaps more likely, because we do not have sufficient data to definitively reject the null hypothesis). However, the one-sided Sign Test tells us to strongly reject the equality of matched pairs of savings estimates for all three savings metrics.
The differences between the IOU-reported and evaluated savings estimates are a key concern for California policymakers. On one hand, it is natural for the IOU-reported and Finally, it is important to note that in assessing the benefits of independent evaluations, these data represent only half the story. Performing ex-post evaluations of energy-efficiency programs has costs as well as benefits. This section has pointed out the benefits of these evaluations both in terms of opportunities for learning and as a check on the incentive of the IOUs to overestimate savings. For a regulator such as the CPUC to determine how to best use these evaluations, it needs to compare these benefits to the costs of the evaluation process to the taxpayers and ratepayers.
Causes of the Differences in Energy-Savings Estimates
Using the dataset described above, we proceed to the second objective of this paper, which is to attempt to answer the following two questions: 1) what differentiates an energyefficiency program that is successful in meeting its ex-ante goals from one that is not?; and 2) what differentiates an energy-efficiency program that has its IOU-reported savings estimates confirmed by an independent evaluation from one that does not? 5
Question 1 Analysis
To answer Question 1, we analyze the realization rates (defined as evaluated savings divided by projected savings) across programs. Higher realization rates imply more successful programs compared to expectations. Recall that realization rates of close to 100 percent imply that the evaluations provide little new information for future program designers and implementers (in addition to what was provided by the projections). Table 4 provides median and mean values for realization rates for the three savings metrics across programs with the different characteristics described above. These values can be compared to the mean and median values for all programs, highlighted and bolded in the top row of Table 4 . Due to the limited number of observations, we urge caution in interpreting the results reported in Table 4 .
Nevertheless, some findings are interesting. For instance, the programs in SDG&E's service territory generally are less successful than those in PG&E's or SCE's. The electricity savings from SCG's programs are based on a very small number of observations because SCG does not sell electricity, and so it only reported electricity savings for a handful of programs. Programs that were in existence from the start of the 2004-2005 cycle were relatively more successful in meeting their annual savings projections than those that commenced operations later in the cycle.
As would be expected, programs that spent a smaller percentage of their budget were less successful in meeting their MW and MWh savings goals (but curiously, this relationship does not hold for therm savings). More cost-effective programs in general had higher realization rates.
Programs evaluated by Large Firm A or Large Firm B, as well as programs evaluated by multiple evaluators, tended to be less successful in meeting their ex-ante projections. Also, evaluations that measured energy savings using Option B of the IPMVP were relatively less successful in meeting their ex-ante projections than were evaluations that used Option A. This result is expected because the two options are identical besides the additional rigor that is 5 Note that we do not imply that the evaluations have necessarily measured the true value of program savings but only that that the evaluated savings estimates should be more accurate than the reported savings estimates because of the increased rigor in the savings calculations and the independence of the third-party evaluators.
required by Option B, which does not permit stipulated parameters. This suggests that the more rigorous are the evaluations, the more valuable they are as replacements for ex-ante projections. 6
Notes: PG&E=Pacific Gas & Electric; SCE=Southern California Edison; SCG=Southern California Gas; SDG&E=San Diego Gas & Electric; TRC=total resources cost ratio; EM&V=evaluation, measurement, and verification; IPMVP=International Performance Measurement & Verification Protocol.
6 The independent contractors that performed the evaluations generally were selected and required to provide a plan for the evalution (subject to CPUC approval) near the beginning of the 2004-2005 program cycle. Therefore, we have no reason to believe that the choice of evaluation methodology was endogeneous. Endogeneity would be a concern if programs that were underperforming were more likely to be evaluated with more rigorous methods. 
Regression Analysis-Question 1:
We ran regression analyses to gain further insight into what differentiates an energyefficiency program that is successful compared to its expectations from one that falls short. The dependent variable in these regressions is the evaluated realization rate (defined as the ratio of evaluated savings to projected savings).
As independent variables, we tested many characteristics of the programs and evaluation process for which summary data are provided above. The advantage of the regression approach is that it allows us to isolate the effects of particular characteristics holding everything else constant.
We used a number of different regression models to account for the limitations of these data. Among these limitations are small sample sizes, outliers in the dependent variable observations, and the potential non-independence of the error terms of certain observations. Due to insufficient data, we did not run regressions on the gas savings metric.
The full model is of the form:
& & where "PG&E," "SCE," and SCG" are dummy variables representing the relevant IOU (with SDG&E omitted); "Commercial," "Industrial," and the three interaction terms are dummy variables representing the customer classes to which the program was offered (the "Residential" customer class is omitted, and the interaction term "Residential*Industrial" was not needed because no programs fell into this category); "TRCcosts" is a continuous variable of total program costs (including participant costs), serving as a proxy for the size of the program; "ExptoBudget" is the ratio of program expenditures to the original program budget, as reported by the IOU; and "EarlyStart" is a dummy variable equal to one if the savings from the program began to accrue before January 2005 and zero otherwise.
We also included regressors relating to the evaluation process: "BigEvals" is a dummy variable equal to one when either Large Firm A or Large Firm B is the third-party evaluator and zero otherwise; "MultEvals" is a dummy variable equal to one if more than one evaluator is listed on the evaluation and zero if just a single evaluator is listed; and "EM&Vbudget" is the percentage of the original program budget allocated to EM&V activities, as reported by the IOU.
We ran five regressions models (for MWh savings and MW savings). Regression (1) is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the full model displayed above. Regression (2) differs from (1) only in that the standard errors have been corrected to adjust for heteroskedasticity.
Regression (3) deals with the concern that the error terms across certain observations may not be independent. A number of evaluations included data from more than one program. This situation occurred when the same program was administered in different IOU service territories.
For example, all four IOUs implemented a program called "Savings by Design," which provided financial incentives to improve the energy efficiency of commercial new construction and industrial projects, and provided electricity and gas savings in each of the IOUs' service territories. To adjust for the likelihood that the observations for each of these four programs will be correlated, the standard errors in Regression (3) are clustered by evaluation.
Regressions (4) and (5) are our attempts to address the influence of outliers in the dependent variable observations. Outliers are relatively common in these data because of the inaccuracy of the estimates of savings. It is well known that the existence of outlier values of the dependent variable can lead to violations of the assumptions of an OLS regression. 7 STATA has two built-in regressions models that are intended to cope with this issue. First, Regression (4) is a "robust regression," which is a form of weighted least squares regression. The robust regression procedure involves an iterative process that drops the most severe outliers and decreases the weight of observations with relatively large residuals (see Hamilton 1992 for a more thorough description of the robust regression).
Finally, Regression (5) is a quantile (median) regression. A quantile regression will eliminate the influence of outliers in the dependent variable observations because the conditional median of the dependent variable is estimated as opposed to the conditional mean.
Tables 5 (MWh savings) and 6 (MW savings) display the regression results, attempting to determine what differentiates an energy-efficiency program that is successful in meeting its exante goals from one that is not. Positive and significant coefficients are indicators that the 7 Specifically, OLS is more efficient than other unbiased estimators as long as errors are normally, independently, and identically distributed. If they are not, other unbiased estimators may outperform OLS (Hamilton 1992). associated regressor is correlated with a higher likelihood of the program meeting its ex-ante projections. 
Question 2 Analysis
To attempt to answer Question 2, we analyze the IOU accuracy ratios (defined as the ratio of evaluated savings to IOU-reported savings) across programs. Recall that higher values for the IOU accuracy ratio imply that independent estimates confirmed (or in some cases exceeded) the IOU-reported savings values. Lower values for this ratio imply that that the evaluations are an important check on incentives of the IOUs. Notes: PG&E=Pacific Gas & Electric; SCE=Southern California Edison; SCG=Southern California Gas; SDG&E=San Diego Gas & Electric; TRC=total resources cost ratio; EM&V=evaluation, measurement, and verification; IPMVP=International Performance Measurement & Verification Protocol. From Table 7 , we note the following trends. Programs in the service territories of PG&E and SCE were more likely to have their reported results confirmed by the evaluations than those in the territories of SDG&E and SCG (which are owned by the same parent company). Also, programs that spent a larger percentage of their budgets had lower IOU accuracy ratios than programs that spent a smaller percentage of their budgets. Finally, the savings estimates for programs evaluated by Large Firm A or Large Firm B had greater downward corrections of IOUreported savings estimates. 
Regression Analysis -Question 2
We ran similar regressions to those displayed above with the IOU accuracy ratios as the dependent variables. As independent variables, we used the same regressors that we used for analyzing Question 1, as well as a quadratic term on program costs, which was added because this additional curvature appears to make a difference in certain regression models. Tables 8 and   9 display the results of the same five regression models, attempting to determine what differentiates an energy-efficiency program that has its IOU-reported savings estimates confirmed by an independent evaluation from one that does not (for both MWh and MW savings). Positive and significant coefficients are indicators of a higher likelihood that the associated regressor is correlated with a greater tendency for third-party evaluations to confirm IOU-reported savings estimates.
From Tables 8 and 9 , once again, we see that for some program characteristics, such as IOU service territory, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect on the IOU accuracy ratios.
Programs that spent a larger percentage of their budgets were more likely to overestimate savings. This may suggest that a higher level of spending provides an additional incentive to the utilities to report a higher level of savings. The size of the program, as captured by program costs, is a positive and significant determinant of the IOU accuracy ratios for the first few regression models, but this effect disappears for the regressions that adjust for outliers.
The most interesting results from Tables 8 and 9 again are the influence of the evaluators.
Programs evaluated by Large Firm A or Large Firm B had relatively larger IOU-reported savings estimates compared to the evaluated savings estimates, since the coefficient on "BigEvals" is significantly negative (and large in magnitude). In other words, these evaluators made larger downward corrections of IOU-reported savings estimates than did the smaller and less popular evaluators. This finding could suggest differences in the evaluations themselves more than differences in the programs being evaluated. 
Evaluators-Scatter Plots
Our findings relating to the largest and most frequently used evaluators merit further examination. Those programs evaluated by either Large Firm A or Large Firm B appear to have significantly lower evaluated savings estimates compared to both projected and IOU-reported savings than those programs evaluated by the other contractors. This indicates that either the particular choice of evaluator is an important determinant of how useful the evaluations are or that some unobservable correlated with the evaluator of the program is responsible for these results.
Figure 9 displays individual data points for the IOU accuracy ratios for savings measured in MWh. The chart on left includes all data points, whereas the chart on the right ignores the outlier points and focuses on range in which most of the points are located.
Notes: IOU=investor-owned utility; MWh=megawatt hours. well as what characteristics of the programs and the evaluation process were correlated with success compared to expectations. We also used these data to gauge the benefits of the thirdparty program evaluations as a check on the incentive of the utilities to overstate energy savings estimates.
We find that most energy-efficiency programs did not meet their energy-savings projections. Also, the IOU-reported savings estimates are systematically higher than the evaluated savings estimates. Interestingly, certain aspects of the evaluation process appear to be a significant determinant of how evaluated savings compare to projections and IOU reported results. In particular, programs evaluated by the largest and most commonly used independent contractors (or an unobservable correlated with this choice) tend to have the lowest evaluated savings estimates.
These results signal to regulators that independent evaluations can be a valuable check on the IOUs ability to make unearned profits and can provide valuable information to future program designers and implementers. However, regulators also need to weigh these benefits against the costs of performing the evaluations.
One limitation of the data used in this paper is that many of the energy-efficiency programs were extremely broad in scope and did not focus on particular customer classes or end uses. This made the process of isolating particular influential features of programs more challenging. Also, while many evaluations are hundreds of pages in length and contain a great deal of detail about the individual programs on which they focused, they contained very different formats and analyses. As a result, comparative analysis is impossible across certain program features or types-such as the use of financial incentives, the level of incentives, and the types of end-uses targeted-and we are unable provide an assessment of how these features of programs affect performance. This severely limits the applicability of these particular results for improving future program designs. To be more useful for future program design, evaluations should catalog information about program features in a standard way across different programs so that the evaluation results can be associated with specific features to facilitate comparative analysis. Such analysis could help program designers target their limited resources to programs that have been proven more effective in producing energy and/or peak load savings. Finally, perhaps the more important limitation of the dataset is the relatively small number observations compared to the amount required to perform a comprehensive analysis of the programs and evaluation processes.
For this reason we urge caution in the interpretation of the paper's results.
Despite these limitations, the 2004-2005 California energy-efficiency program cycle
offers a unique opportunity to compare various estimates of energy savings and the associated characteristics of programs and the evaluation process. We are hopeful that our findings will be useful in designing energy-efficiency programs and determining how to use independent thirdparty program evaluations in the future.
